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ABSTRACT 
The United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been 
working together on a program called the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program. The purpose of 
this program is to return Soviet or Russian-supplied high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel, currently stored at 
Russian-designed research reactors throughout the world, to Russia. To accommodate transport of the HEU spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF), a new large-capacity transport/storage cask system was specially designed for handling and 
operations under the unique conditions at these research reactor facilities. This new cask system is named the 
ŠKODA VPVR/M cask. The design, licensing, testing, and delivery of this new cask system result from a significant 
international cooperative effort by several countries and involved numerous private and governmental organizations. 
This paper contains the following sections: 1) Introduction; 2) VPVR/M Cask Description; 3) Ancillary Equipment, 
4) Cask Licensing; 5) Cask Demonstration and Operations; 6) IAEA Procurement, Quality Assurance Inspections, 
Fabrication, and Delivery; and, 7) Conclusions. 
INTRODUCTION
Since December 1999, representatives from the United States, the Russian Federation, and IAEA have been 
working on a program to return Soviet or Russian-supplied HEU fuel, currently stored at foreign research reactors, 
to Russia. The primary goal of the RRRFR Program is to advance nuclear nonproliferation objectives by eliminating 
stockpiles of HEU and encouraging eligible countries to convert their research reactors from HEU to low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel upon availability, qualification, and licensing of suitable LEU fuel. 
Transporting the large quantities of HEU SNF stored at many of the Russian-origin research reactors 
required that the RRRFR Program identify or develop a new large-capacity cask system. However, not enough 
existing casks were available to meet the needs of the program; therefore, the decision was made to pursue new cask 
systems. The IAEA agreed to assist the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by sending out a request for proposal and 
procuring a new cask system. A detailed discussion about IAEA procurement is discussed in the IAEA Procurement, 
Quality Assurance Inspections, Fabrication, and Delivery section of this paper. 
To effectively and efficiently handle this HEU SNF, the IAEA selected a new transport/storage cask system 
called the VPVR/M cask. This paper provides descriptions of the VPVR/M cask, licensing, demonstration of its use, 
fabrication, quality inspections and acceptance, and deliverance of 10 of these casks and ancillary equipment. 
VPVR/M CASK DESCRIPTION 
The VPVR/M cask is a type B(U) and S cask system designed and licensed for transport and storage of 
SNF from Russian-origin research reactors. The VPVR/M cask has a unique design in that it allows either top or 
bottom loading/ unloading. The cask consists of a massive, cast steel, cylindrical body. The upper and lower parts of 
the body are tapered, which was done to minimize the overall cask weight to accommodate the limited overhead 
crane limits in most research reactor facilities. The cask’s internal walls have a hot aluminium spray coating. 
The SNF basket inside the cask has 36 square ports for holding the assemblies during transport and storage and is  
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made out of atabor (boron-treated steel) 
sheets. A central suspension/hanger rod, 
running down the middle of the basket, is 
used to raise or lower the basket out of the 
cask.
Figure 1. Schematic of the VPVR/M transport and storage cask. 
The cask contains a system of two 
upper and two lower lids, with each lid 
independently bolted to the cask body. To 
provide containment during transport and 
storage, each lid has metallic Helicoflex 
gaskets. These gaskets are replaced by 
elastomer o-ring seals when the cask is 
transported empty. Figure 1 shows a 
schematic of the cask. Table 1 identifies the 
cask components and specifications. 
The upper and lower primary lids 
are made of 220-mm (9-in.) thick, stainless 
steel, cylindrical plates. The upper lid has 
drying and leak-testing ports that are sealed 
by shielding plugs when not in use. The 
upper lid also has a central hole and two 
side holes used to lower and raise the fuel 
basket into the storage pools. 
The lower primary lid has a 
specially designed bayonet lock and two 
threaded pull rods (see Figure 2). 
The bayonet lock is designed to lock the 
central suspension/hanger, with two 
threaded pull rods, to the special lift fixtures 
for lowering and raising the lid with the 
basket in the storage pools (see Figure 3). 
When the central suspension/hanger is not 
engaged in the bayonet lock, the basket can 
be lifted out of the cask without the lower 
lid being attached (see Figure 4). 
Table 1. VPVR/M cask components and specifications. 
Component Material 
Dimension
(mm and in.) 
Weight
(kg and lb) 
Body Cast iron 10,700 kg/23,589 lb 
  External 
    Height (without absorber) 1,505 mm/59 in. 
    Diameter 1,200 mm/47 in. 
  Cavity 
    Height 885 mm/35 in. 
    Diameter 600 mm/24 in. 
  Wall thickness 300 mm/12 in. 
Basket Atabor (1.5% boron-treated 
steel sheets) 
3.63-mm/0.14-in. thick 
833-mm/33-in. high 
553-mm/22-in. wide 
180 kg/397 lb 
Lids—upper/lower (4) 1,650 kg/3,638 lb 
  Primary—upper/lower Stainless steel 220-mm/9-in. thick 
630-mm/25-in. diameter 
518 to 530 kg/ 
1,142 to 1,168 lb 
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Component Material 
Dimension
(mm and in.) 
Weight
(kg and lb) 
  Secondary—upper/lower Carbon steel 80-mm/3-in. thick 
840-mm/33-in. diameter 
300 to 316 kg/ 
661 to 697 lb 
Shock absorbers Carbon steel/wood 1,500-mm/59-in. diameter 1,600 kg/3,527 lb 
Payload (36 assemblies) 450 kg/992 lb 
Totals 2,155 mm/85 in. 12,390 kg/27,315 lb 
The upper and lower secondary lids are carbon 
steel, 80-mm (3-in.) thick, round plates that fit on a 
sealing surface inside the cask and are flush to the top and 
bottom of the cask body outer rim. Both lids have 
two concentric grooves used to hold the Helicoflex 
metallic gaskets; these gaskets are needed to seal the cask 
when it is loaded with SNF. The space between the 
primary and secondary lids is filled with helium, and a 
vacuum is pulled between the two seals to check for a 
leak between the seals. Once the leak test has been 
successfully performed, the test port is plugged and leak 
tested. The lower secondary lid does not have vacuum 
and helium valve ports. Each of the secondary lids is 
attached to the cask body by 28 M-36 × 70 bolts. 
Elastomer seals can be used to transport the empty casks. 
Each cask has four lifting/handling trunnions, 
two on each side of the cask. Two shock absorbers are 
bolted by four M-30 bolts to each end of the cask. The shock absorbers protect the cask and payload in the unlikely 
event of an accident during transport. 
Figure 2. Lower lid central hole with bayonet lock 
and side pull rods. 
Figure 3. Basket and lower lid being lowered using 
basket central suspension/hanger and the centering 
fixture pull rods. 
Figure 4. Basket being lifted out of the cask using 
the central suspension/hanger. 
The casks are licensed to be transported by road, railway, river, and sea. The VPVR/M casks are licensed to 
transport SNF from Russian-origin research reactors. The types of fuels licensed for transport are EK-10, S-36, 
VVR-M, VVR-M2, VVR-M5, VVR-M7, VVR-(S)M, IRT-2M, IRT-3M, and TVR-S. The types of SNF currently 
licensed for storage are EK-10, IRT-2M, and IRT-3M (IRT-3M and IRT-2M, with an initial 90% width enrichment of 
235U, are not licensed for storage in the VPVR/M casks). Table 2 shows the content allowed in the VPVR/M casks 
for transport and storage. 
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT 
Ancillary equipment for the VPVR/M cask system includes the basket alignment tool; cask manipulating 
frame; cask tiedown system; drying/leak-testing equipment; numerous lift fixtures, casks, and fuel-handling tools; 
and six special-designed and certified International Shipping Organization (ISO) containers. Three cask storage 
positions exist in the ISO container. The center position is used when one cask is being hauled. The two positions at 
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each end of the ISO container are used when two casks are being hauled. The ISO container can only haul up to two 
casks.
Table 2. Content allowed for transport and storage in a VPVR/M cask. 
Allowed in VPVR/M Cask Maximum Units 
Number of assemblies in one cask 36
Total activity in one cask 3,93.1015Bq 
Residual heat in one assembly 37,5 W 
Total residual heat one cask 450 W 
Allowable 235U in one assembly 500 g 
Minimum cooling times of spent nuclear fuel Dependent on nuclear fuel burnup 
Specially designed, stainless steel, hermetic sealed can/sheath Damaged fuel assembly, fuel rods, or 
parts of fuel rods 
CASK LICENSING 
The VPVR/M cask is licensed for transport in the Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine. The Czech Republic licensed the VPVR/M cask for transport and storage under reference number 
CZ/048/B(U)F-96, and its code for international identification is CZ/048/B(U)F-96 (Revision 1). This license is 
valid until July 11, 2011. SKODA JS a.s. submitted the cask licensing application to the Czech State Office of 
Nuclear Safety (SÚJB) on December 20, 2004. SÚJB evaluated the application against the pertinent requirements in 
Czech law, Act No. 18/1997 Coll. SKODA provided all material requested from SÚJB and the license was issued 
March 23, 2005 [1]. The VPVR/M cask meets the requirements of the IAEA recommendations [2] and the 
international traffic regulations that are referred to by the IAEA [3]. 
Before the VPVR/M cask, the Russian Federation had never issued a certificate for a packaging design to a 
cask of foreign design. However, the Russian’s have issued licenses for one-time only emergency shipments 
(e.g., NAC-LWT was licensed to transport HEU SNF by air from Iraq in the 1990s following the first Gulf War). 
The process for licensing a Type B cask in the Russian Federation is quite complicated. Figure 5 provides a flow 
chart that shows the licensing process. 
Figure 5. Flowchart showing the process for obtaining a Type B cask certificate in the Russian Federation. 
The Sosny R&D Company, a privately owned Russian company under contract to the Nuclear Research 
Institute (NRI), managed the technical effort needed for obtaining the Russian certificate. Sosny divided the 
licensing process into two phases. Phase I verified that the cask design could be licensed in the Russian Federation. 
Sosny obtained the services of Russian technical experts in licensing of Type B packages in the Russian Federation 
to review the certification safety documentation provided by SKODA and NRI for licensing of the VPVR/M cask in 
the Czech Republic. The reviewers evaluated the safety documents to determine if they were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the Russian legislation for the safety of radioactive materials transportation. The Russian experts 
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identified the following additional safety documentation needed to meet the Russian radiation and nuclear safety 
regulations: 1) additional structural analysis was needed to show that the package design would not experience 
brittle fracture under accident conditions at negative environment temperatures (i.e., down to -40°C); 2) verification 
of air tightness under emergency conditions after mechanical and thermal total effect; 3) substantiation of vibration 
resistance during transportation per requirements of the TS-R-1 and NP-053-04 regulations; and 4) verification that 
a damaged fuel basket and canisters are able to withstand dynamic loads from a container dropped from a height of 
9 meters. SKODA provided the analysis and data needed to satisfy these comments. 
Phase II involved developing the supporting documents and Russian application [4] for certifying the 
VPVR/M package design in the Russian Federation. The Russian PVSR-92 regulations [4] required that the 
shipment consignee in Russia, Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) PA Mayak, submit the application to 
Rosatom (the Russian competent authority in the field of atomic energy use). 
Two expert organizations under Rosatom, FSUE “VNIIEF” and FSUE “IPPE,” performed verification 
calculations and prepared the documentation needed for demonstrating that the VPVR/M cask design met the 
International TS-R-1 [3] and Russian NP-053-04 regulations [5]. FSUE “VNIIEF” prepared safety documents that 
confirmed the structural, thermal, leak tightness, radiation, and nuclear safety of the cask design under normal and 
hypothetical accident conditions. FSUE “IPPE” provided safety documentation and analysis that demonstrated 
radiation and nuclear safety for the cask design under normal and hypothetical accident transportation conditions. 
Because the VPVR/M cask design had not been subjected to actual testing under hypothetical accident 
transport conditions (i.e., a drop from 9 meters, puncture test, fire, and submersion underwater), FSUE “VNIIEF” 
performed a drop analysis from 12 meters to confirm that the cask design had a safety margin. The calculations 
showed that the cask design has a sufficient safety margin in relation to established dynamic loads. The cask meets 
Russian Federation requirements from the packaging regulations used to transport fissile materials. 
FSUE “VNIIEF” prepared a draft of the Russian certificate. The draft certificate was reviewed and agreed 
to by NRI ěež, FSUE “PA Mayak,” Rosatom Departments, FMBA (i.e., state regulatory body for hygiene and 
sanitary aspects of radioactive materials safety during transportation), and Rostechnadzor (i.e., state regulatory body 
for technical aspects of radioactive materials safety during transportation) before being sent to Rosatom for 
approval. On January 23, 2006, Rosatom approved certificate RUS/3065/B(U)F-96 for the VPVR/M package 
design. The certificate is valid for 3 years (i.e., until January 23, 2009). 
Certifying the cask design for transport through Slovakia and Ukraine was fairly simple because the design 
is already certified for transport in the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation, and the design meets the IAEA 
TS-R-1 international transportation requirements. Competent authorities in Slovakia and Ukraine were given copies 
of the cask design safety documentation and certificates from the Czech Republic and Russian Federation for 
approval. Both countries approved use of the cask within their territory and did not require a detailed evaluation of 
the design safety. 
CASK DEMONSTRATION AND OPERATIONS 
The VPVR/M cask underwent three demonstrations to verify the design was technically acceptable for 
handling and loading with fuel at the research reactor facilities, and for receipt and unloading at the Mayak facilities 
in Russia. The demonstrations were held at the SKODA, NRI, and Mayak facilities. The following subsections 
provide a summary of those demonstrations. 
SKODA Manufacturing Facilities
The first demonstration was required by the DOE technical team to verify that the VPVR/M cask design 
was technically acceptable for use by the RRRFR Program. The demonstration was conducted at Plzen, Czech 
Republic, in a large pit at one end of the SKODA JS a.s. 
reactor shop manufacturing facility. The demonstration was 
performed by SKODA technicians in accordance with 
detailed operating procedure Ae 11 566/Dok, and they used 
a prototype of the VPVR/M cask. The demonstration 
included the following: 1) performing a leak test of the top 
(secondary) lid seals (see Figure 6); 2) removing the top 
primary lids and the fuel basket (simulating fuel basket 
unloading at Mayak); 3) lowering the lower primary (inner) 
lid, with the empty basket attached, from the cask into a pit, 
and demonstrating the loading of a dummy fuel assembly 
into the basket (similar to operations to be performed at NRI 
in ěež); and 4) demonstrating the accidental failure of the 
central suspension/hanger, causing the drop of a full basket. Figure 6. VPVR/M cask leak test demonstration. 
The tests were all successfully completed. The 
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adequacy of the cask design for leak testing, basket top unloading, and bottom loading were confirmed. The drop 
test showed that the two side-threaded pull rods can withstand a 5-mm drop of a simulated loaded basket if the 
central suspension/hanger accidentally fails during handling. While the tests were successful, several improvements 
were identified that could make operations easier and reduce the potential radiation dose to workers.
Nuclear Research Institute Wet Run
The purpose of the NRI “wet run” was to 1) demonstrate that the newly designed, fabricated, and installed 
cask and fuel-handling equipment worked properly at the reactor facility and at the high-level waste storage (HLWS) 
facility; 2) demonstrate that the detailed operating procedures were complete and operational; 3) demonstrate the 
training of the NRI technicians for handling the ISO container, VPVR/M cask, loading fuel into the basket remotely, 
and drying and sealing of the cask; and 4) preparing the cask for transport and loading into the ISO container and 
tying the cask down. A description of the process was provided in the technical resources manual entitled, Demo Test 
Wet Run of the VPVR/M ŠKODA Transport Cask in the 
Reactor and HLWS Building at the Nuclear Research 
Institute ěež plc. The “wet run” was observed by 
representatives from the United States, Ukraine, Poland, 
Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and various 
organizations from the Czech Republic. 
The demonstration started at the reactor facility. 
The NRI technicians demonstrated removal of the top and 
bottom lids. Removing the lid from the bottom of the cask 
requires that it be rotated to the vertical position and secured 
in place (see Figure 7). The bolts were removed from the 
lid, and the lid was removed. A sealing surface protector 
was installed, and a specially designed crush device was 
installed on the cask bottom outer lid surface and the bottom 
of the shield plug. The cask was then rotated on the cask 
manipulation frame so that the top lid could be removed. 
A specially designed cask transport carriage was 
moved by rail from the SNF storage area into the reactor 
building. The cask was lifted from the cask manipulation fixture and placed onto the transport carriage. The cask 
was tied down. The loaded transport carriage was moved back into the SNF storage area and secured so that the cask 
was located directly over a special platform designed to 
hold the basket during underwater fuel loading into the 
storage pool (see Figure 8). The specially designed basket 
handling tool was attached to the crane and moved over the 
cask. The tool center grapple was attached to the basket 
center rod, then a nut was removed from one of the side 
rods, and the corresponding rod was installed. The operation 
was repeated for the second rod. With the basket tool firmly 
installed, the basket was lowered into the pool and set onto 
the basket-loading platform. The technicians demonstrated 
the loading of dummy fuel assemblies into the basket ports 
that are the hardest to reach from the side of the pool. After 
fuel loading was demonstrated, the technicians finished 
filling the basket with dummy fuel assemblies so that the 
basket and cask would simulate the loaded weight. 
Figure 7. VPVR/M cask secured in vertical 
position on cask manipulation frame. 
The loaded basket was pulled up into the cask. The 
crane and lift fixtures have been equipped with a digital 
dynamometer that is used to monitor the weight of the basket during reinstallation into the cask. Visually, it is not 
possible to see the basket being lifted into the cask because of shielding that is placed around the cask during that 
operation. The basket was slowly lifted until it was totally inside the cask body. This was determined by a significant 
increased weight reading on the dynamometers. The lifting was stopped. The side legs of the lift fixture were 
disconnected, one leg at a time, from the basket side rods. A nut was used to secure the rod to the cask upper inner 
lid. This process was repeated for the other side rod. The center basket rod was ungrappled. 
Figure 8. VPVR/M cask being moved into the 
spent nuclear fuel storage area. 
The technicians demonstrated installation and removal of the cask shielding. The shielding is needed to 
protect workers from radiation when the loaded basket is lifted out of the water and before it is totally inside the 
cask. A nitrogen line was hooked up to the top of the cask, and an off-gas hose was connected between a specially 
designed port on the shielding around the cask and the facility off-gas system. Heated nitrogen was pumped from the 
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top of the cask, through the fuel and basket, and out through the exhaust hose. This is done to remove most of the 
water before moving the cask back into the reactor area. 
The nitrogen hose and exhaust hoses were removed. The cask, loaded with dummy fuel, was transported on 
the carriage back into the reactor area. The cask was removed from the carriage and placed in the horizontal back 
onto the cask manipulation frame. Water that was trapped in the basket and crush fixture spilled onto the floor 
during this operation. 
The lids were installed at each end of the cask in reverse of the lid removal operation. A specially designed 
vacuum-drying system was attached to the port on the bottom lid of the cask. The operators explained how the 
vacuum-drying system tested and recorded the status of the drying. 
The cask was left to dry overnight with the vacuum-drying system operating. The drying was not finished 
the next morning as hoped because of leakage around the lid seals. The lid had been removed and reinstalled so 
many times that the seals were not functioning properly. The technicians torqued the lid bolts tighter, and the drying 
was completed within 2 hours. Helium leak testing equipment was installed, and a lid leak test was demonstrated. 
Both the inner and outer lid seals were tested. 
The lower shock absorber was installed. The transport truck with the specially designed and certified ISO 
container was backed into the reactor building. The cask was placed into the center cask storage position in the ISO 
container. The upper shock absorber was installed. 
The loaded truck was moved to the HLWS building. The truck had to pass through the village of ěež to get 
to the facility. A large mobile crane was used to remove the 
ISO container, with the loaded VPVR/M cask inside, from 
the truck and place it onto the ground. A transfer carriage, 
comprised of portable rails with a transfer cart, was set up 
to receive the cask from the ISO container and move it to 
the HLWS building loading dock. A transfer carriage was 
needed because there was not enough room in the loading 
dock area for the truck to back into and unload the cask 
from the ISO container. 
Figure 9. VPVR/M cask being prepared for lifting 
inside the high-level waste storage building. 
The cask was transferred by mobile crane from 
the ISO container to the transfer carriage and tied down. 
The loaded carriage was moved into the loading dock area 
(see Figure 9). The upper shock absorber was removed. 
The cask was lifted by the facility overhead crane 
from the cart up to the second level of the storage area and 
placed on the cask-maneuvering fixture. The bottom shock 
absorber was removed, and the outer lids were removed as 
previously described. 
The cask was then transferred from the cask-maneuvering fixture into a specially designed cask 
loading/unloading bridge that spanned a large empty storage tank. The basket-handling fixture was installed, and the 
loaded basket was lowered to the bottom of the tank. The technicians demonstrated removal of several dummy fuel 
assemblies. The demonstration was stopped at this point. All follow-on activities had already been demonstrated. 
The “wet run” was very successful; however, the following improvements were identified: 1) a catch pan 
for water from the crush pad and holes may need to be made in the tubing so that water can drain out; and 2) the 
metallic Helicoflex seals need to be changed out for elastomer seals to transport the empty cask. The Helicoflex 
seals are very expensive and hard to reuse. 
Mayak Dry Run
The third demonstration was performed at the FSUE Mayak Production Association facilities in Ozyorsk, 
Russia. The purpose for the dry run was to 1) demonstrate the setup of cask-handling and auxiliary equipment in the 
Mayak facilities; 2) demonstrate that detailed operating procedures were complete and operational; 3) demonstrate 
training of the Mayak technicians for handling the ISO container and VPVR/M cask and unloading the basket 
remotely; and 4) perform cask maintenance in preparation for loading the empty cask for transport and loading it 
into the ISO container, tying it down, and returning it to the originating facility. The dry run was attended by 
representatives from the Czech Republic (e.g., NRI and SKODA), DOE, FSUE Mayak, Sosny R&D Company, and 
Rostechnadzor. 
Sosny prepared a special report [6]; this report identified the unit under test, test objectives, general 
information, safety measures, test preparations, scope of work and conditions of test performance, and conclusions 
and recommendations. Equipment developed and fabricated to handle the VPVR/M cask at FSUE Mayak included 
1) equipment for acceptance and unloading of ISO containers; 2) specially designed and fabricated fixture for 
holding VPVR/M casks inside the special railcar wagon container for transporting the VPVR/M cask within the 
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plant; 3) a remote-control device to operate overhead crane and a frequency converter to control the crane velocity 
during cask and basket-handling operations; and 4) miscellaneous vertical spacers, adapters, captures, and rods. 
Before beginning the dry run, the FSUE Mayak representative discussed the problems they had 
encountered during receipt of the equipment. The most significant problems include the following: 1) lack of 
preparation time because the equipment took longer than planned to travel from ěež, Czech Republic, to FSUE 
Mayak in Ozyorsk, Russia; 2) some of the equipment did not work because it needed different bolts; 3) there were 
problems getting through customs because some of the numbers did not match the manifest numbers; and 4) the 
cask tiedowns were loose upon arrival and bolts from the bottom shock absorber had fallen out. 
The dry run began in the building for vehicle preparations where the railcar, ISO container, and VPVR/M 
cask were staged. The fixture for the ISO container did not fit; therefore, it had to be modified before the ISO 
container was lifted off the railcar. The dry run began with removal of the ISO container lid. Then the bolts attaching 
the upper shock absorber to the cask were removed, and the upper shock absorber was removed and placed in 
storage. The tiedowns were removed after operational personnel explained how the tiedowns were loose upon arrival 
at Mayak from ěež. The cask, with lower shock absorber attached, was removed from the ISO container and placed 
onto the cask manipulation frame and rotated to the horizontal position. The lower impact was removed and placed 
in storage. At this point, Mayak personnel showed how the bolts falling out of the lower shock absorber during 
transport from ěež to Mayak caused the rubbing/gouging marks on the inside of the shock absorber. They also 
showed that the upper cask trunnions were gouged as a result of tiedowns loosening during transport. 
The cask was lifted from the cask manipulation frame 
to the vertical position and moved to a specially designed hopper 
with a lid-type railcar used for Mayak onsite fuel movement 
operations. The cask was lifted up over the side of the railcar 
and placed in a specially designed and fabricated fixture for the 
VPVR/M casks. The cask was not tied down inside the railcar 
during onsite transport because the train is limited to 5 k/hr 
during transport. The loaded railcar was moved into the hot 
shop/pool area in the building for unloading. The hot shop is a 
large narrow high bay with rail access, two specially designed 
overhead cranes with cages, and different grapples for different 
operations. There is a wall between the high-bay, cask-handling 
room and the large SNF storage pools. There are specially 
designed shoots, with carts, to transfer the loaded SNF basket 
from the cask into the storage pool. The cask was depressurized 
and a gas sample was taken before removing the outer 
(secondary) lid from the cask (see Figure 10). The outer lid was 
removed, stored, and a seal-protection cover was installed in the 
cask. The inner (primary) lid was removed and stored. The 
Mayak representative explained that under normal 
circumstances, all operations from this point forward would be 
done remotely and all personnel would be required to leave the 
high-bay area. The representative explained that the remote 
operations are performed, using special lighting and cameras, in 
a special control room that is shielded from the high bay. 
The basket loaded with dummy fuel assemblies was 
lifted out of the cask, over a wall, and placed inside the specially 
modified fuel-handling cart for holding the VPVR/M fuel basket 
(see Figure 11). The cart was lowered into the SNF pool. The 
Mayak operators then demonstrated removal of the dummy SNF 
assemblies from the cask basket and placement of them into the 
Mayak storage basket. The pool is set up with three emptied 
baskets so that the emptied basket can be moved to a special decontamination facility for cleaning before reloading 
into the cask. This operation was not demonstrated. 
Figure 10. Mayak technicians depressurizing 
before opening the VPVR/M cask lid. 
Figure 11. VPVR/M cask basket inside the 
specially modified Mayak storage pool 
fuel-handling cart. 
After demonstrating the unloading of fuel from the basket, the cask was reassembled and returned to the 
building for vehicle preparations. The cask was disassembled in order to demonstrate assembly of the cask after 
decontamination. The operations were as follows: first, the outer lid was turned over and the metallic seals were 
replaced with elastomer seals. The lid was then lifted and turned over for placement onto the cask. The outer 
elastomer seal fell out of the lid seal groove, preventing the operation from being completed. The plastic seal holder 
used for the metallic seals was not designed to hold both the inner and outer seals in place. As a temporary solution 
to the problem, the Mayak operations personnel used grease to hold the seal in place while the lid was installed on 
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the cask. Second, the lower primary lid with the basket was installed, followed by installation of the bottom 
secondary lid. Third, the central suspension/hanger was installed in the bottom primary lid. Fourth, the basket was 
placed in the cask and the upper primary lid was installed. Fifth, the outer secondary lid was installed. Sixth, the 
cask was rotated to the horizontal position and a pressure test of the cask assembly was successfully performed. 
Seventh, the lower shock absorber was installed and the assembled cask was placed into the ISO container and tied 
down. Finally, the upper shock absorber was installed, which concluded the dry run. 
The dry run was a success, and the Mayak operations personnel, procedures, and the VPVR/M cask system 
were adequately demonstrated. Areas of improvement identified include the following: 1) information provided to 
Russian customs needs to be accurate; 2) all bolts need to be lubricated and inspected before each use; 3) a quality 
assurance inspector, or equivalent, needs to independently verify critical operations; 4) a load cell should be used for 
most lifts to ensure that cask components and fixtures are not overstressed; 5) the lid seal holder needs to be 
redesigned; 6) the tiedown and bottom shock absorber bolt problem needs to be formally documented, evaluated, 
and a disposition identified and approved; 7) a special tool needs to be designed for removing the seals; and 8) care 
needs to be taken to ensure that the stainless-steel components of the cask are not exposed to carbon steel 
contamination. 
IAEA PROCUREMENT, QUALITY ASSURANCE INSPECTIONS, FABRICATION, AND 
DELIVERY
The DOE RRRFR Program did not have a high-capacity cask and enough total casks to haul all of the HEU 
SNF from NRI to Mayak in one shipment. To assist in resolving this problem, the IAEA agreed to use their 
procurement system to send out a request for proposal and procure enough casks to meet the NRI shipment needs. 
On July 25, 2005, the IAEA issued the request for proposal [7]. October 24 through 28, 2005, an evaluation 
group, consisting of five international expert consultants, was convened at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna to 
perform a technical review and evaluation of the bids submitted in response to IAEA’s procurement request. The 
financial evaluation of the proposals was completed by a different, independent group. Technical experts evaluated 
cask systems’ proposals from six international cask vendors. 
All of the vendors provided proposals that met at least parts of the scope of the request for proposal. 
However; only one of the suppliers, SKODA JS a.s., offering the VPVR/M cask system, met all of the scope 
requirements. The SKODA proposal not only met all of the scope requirements, but also provided additional 
benefits to the program. The SKODA proposal 1) committed to deliver 10 units within 10 months of the contract 
awarding; 2) had already licensed the cask for transport and storage in the Czech Republic and were in the process 
of licensing it in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Slovakia; 3) had NRI offering to provide, to the RRRFR 
Program, their six VPVR/M casks (adding the ability to haul an additional 216 spent fuel assemblies) after 
completing the transfer of their LEU fuel to Russia; 4) had much of the preparations for handling the cask system 
already in place at NRI ěež; and 5) the cask system was 
confirmed to be acceptable for use at Mayak. 
A tripartite contract, finalized in December 2005, 
between IAEA, ŠKODA JS a.s, and Ústav jaderného výzkumu 
ěež a.s. (NRI ěež, plc) formalized an initial order for 
eight VPVR/M casks, and shipping containers, tooling, and 
other ancillary equipment as shown in Figure 12. The contract 
included extensive fabrication, inspection, and testing 
provisions; licensing and quality requirements; and an option for 
the purchase of two additional casks, which was later exercised 
by IAEA. An inspection plan was developed to manage contract 
implementation. This plan was implemented through a series of 
factory inspections at the ŠKODA JS a.s. manufacturing 
facilities.
In addition to provision of the casks and related 
ancillary equipment, the contract scope included certain 
licensing and demonstration requirements. To fulfill the contract, 
the supplier was required to either obtain a license for the cask or satisfy all necessary requirements to obtain an 
eventual license in the Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Slovakia. In March 2005, before signing 
the contract, the cask license had been obtained within the Czech Republic. Following a rigorous, independent 
technical review, the cask system was subsequently licensed within the Russian Federation. The Ukraine license 
followed a few months later. Discussions between NRI ěež and Slovakian officials provided adequate assurance that 
the cask system met the licensing requirements within Slovakia. 
Figure 12. SKODA VPVR/M cask and 
ancillary equipment. 
The contract split the manufacturing inspections into an initial quality audit and five factory acceptance 
inspections. A contract review meeting held in January 2006 developed the initial schedule. The audit and 
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inspections were then completed as indicated in the timeline shown in Figure 13. During the quality audit, IAEA 
reviewed the supplier’s quality system, including the Fabrication, Test, and Inspection Plan and relevant 
hold/witness points. During subsequent factory acceptance inspections, several tests were witnessed (e.g., leak tests, 
load tests, and die penetrant tests) and the Fabrication Data Packages (one for each cask) were reviewed and 
accepted by IAEA and observed by DOE. Final acceptance was completed by IAEA and NRI ěež. 
Figure 13. International Atomic Energy Agency contract for the VPVR/M cask procurement timeline. 
In parallel with manufacturing, a dry run test, 
previously discussed, was performed in the fuel processing 
facility at Mayak. This evolution helped identify needed 
improvements in the cask-handling and tiedown systems. The 
fairly harsh conditions involved in rail transport from the 
Czech Republic to the Mayak facility managed to loosen 
turnbuckles, which then allowed the casks to undergo fairly 
rapid, vibration-induced wear as shown in Figure 14. While 
the cask satisfied all requirements with regard to its interface 
with the Mayak facility, the transport issue resulted in a 
significant review and overhaul of the tiedown system. 
The review considered the tiedown system condition before 
shipment, the as-found condition at Mayak, and the principal 
and contributing causes. Following a thorough review by all 
relevant stakeholders, including the regulator, a corrective 
action report was released that detailed the above information 
and recommended design modifications and follow-up testing. 
Tests included further rail transport under both normal and 
artificially harsh conditions. All recommendations of the 
report were subsequently implemented, and all testing was 
concluded in time to supply the 10 VPVR/M casks without adversely affecting the quality, cost, or schedule. 
Figure 14. Cask trunnion wear resulting from 
loosening of the tiedown system during 
transport of the VPVR/M cask between NRI in 
Rez and Mayak in the Russian Federation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The VPVR/M cask is an excellent cask system for use by the RRRFR Program to transport HEU SNF from 
the various Russian-origin research reactors throughout the world to Mayak in the Russian Federation. The cask is 
licensed in four countries: Czech Republic, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The VPVR/M cask is the 
first foreign cask to be licensed for multiple uses in the Russian Federation. It is licensed to be transported by road, 
railway, river, and sea. The cask is also licensed to transport 10 fuel types and to store three fuel types from 
Russian-origin research reactors. 
The VPVR/M cask was specially designed for handling in Russian-origin research reactor facilities. It is a 
high-capacity cask. Each cask has a 36-assembly capacity. There are 16 casks total (10 casks procured by IAEA for 
DOE and 6 casks procured by NRI), with a total capability for transporting 576 assemblies. 
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The VPVR/M cask has unique features for accommodating the special needs of the Russian-origin research 
reactor facilities. The top and bottom loading and unloading feature makes the cask especially convenient and 
efficient for use in the limited areas and overhead crane capacities at most of these reactor facilities. 
The cask system, with all features, has been thoroughly demonstrated at the SKODA JS a.s. manufacturing 
facilities in Plzen, Czech Republic; NRI facilities at ěež; and Mayak facilities in Ozyorsk, Russia. Improvements, 
deficiencies, and lessons learned from those demonstrations have been incorporated and corrected to improve the 
operability of the cask system. 
The first RRRFR Program shipment to use these casks will be the LEU and HEU SNF from NRI at ěež in 
the Czech Republic. All 16 casks will be used for that shipment. The shipment is scheduled to be made the last 
quarter of 2007. Following completion of the NRI shipment, the casks are scheduled for use in other countries 
(e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland). 
Also, an effort is underway to evaluate licensing of a modified VPVR/M cask design as a Type C air 
transport cask. If successful, the casks may be used to transport SNF from countries with difficult transport 
requirements, such as Libya and Vietnam. 
The successful implementation of the IAEA tripartite contract for supply of the 10 VPVR/M casks reflects 
the significant and cooperative effort of numerous individuals within several organizations. The audit and inspection 
plans developed early in the process were fully executed while the team worked to address the issues identified 
during the Mayak demonstration. It is worthy to highlight that this challenge was overcome and the entire scope was 
fulfilled without impacting the quality, schedule, or budget, and in a manner that precluded any additional 
inspections. 
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